Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying explicitly the role of information in economic situations. For example, Hirschleifer [6] and Marshall [10] investigated the social and private value of information in general equilibrium models in which there are uncertainties on the initial endowments. There has also been interest in some specific models including production (Arrow [1] , Green [4] ). In many such investigations, the strategic analysis of the role of information remains incomplete, in particular, it may not be specified whether uninformed agents are aware of the information acquisition obtained by others and may adapt to the new situation, or, the possible spreading of information (which may involuntarily take place through the informed agents' activity) may be ignored thus over-evaluating the value of private information. In a strategic analysis of information performed in a game theoretic framework, such factors may appear essential and could give rise to many counterintuitive results such as bluff, signalling, negative value of information, controlled transmission of information and so on (Aumann and Maschler [3] , Ponssard [12] , Levine and Ponssard [8] ). The corresponding game models belong to the class of games with incomplete information introduced by Harsanyi [5] .
The subject of this paper is to study the strategic role of information in a partial equilibrium economic situation using as a model a game with incomplete information. Though the emphasis was not on the role of information, this class of games has already been used in the economic literature (d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [2], Wilson [13] ). This paper may be seen as an attempt to use such models for bringing out specific insights about the role of information, e.g., market research.
The situation to be studied concerns an oligopolistic market for an homogenous product, the demand for which is uncertain. ihe questions of interest concern the incentives for firms to acquire private information. This will be shown to strongly depend on the number of firms who do so. The consumer's point of view will also be taken into account so that one may discuss the social value of information. This situation is modeled as a simple oligopolistic market game with linear demand and cost functions. The advantage of this model is that it is mathematically tractable (and it may not be an overstatement to say that games with incomplete information are complex due to the fact that a strategy is not a number but a function of the state of information). The drawback is of course that the results are constrained by the narrow assumptions.
The Model and Its Solution 1. Assumptions
Consider the following simple oligopolistic market model for an homogenous product:
The demand function is linear, if p denotes the price, q the quantity, D and a two parameters, we have: Let II denote the subset of informed firms whereas I2 denotes the subset of uninformed ones. For simplicity, we shall refer to this game as the II informed game. An equilibrium point of the I, informed game is a vector of functions (l(@), ... . ., X(@), Xk +1 .1 . ., X ), in which the informed firms select the quantity to be produced as a function of the true value d. The uninformed firms select only a point; note that for them the decisions taken by the informed firms will appear as random variables since they do not know d.
One may obtain the, equilibrium point in this game, writing that informed firms maximize their profit conditional on d, whereas uninformed firms maximize expected profit (Harsanyi [5] 2 It should be noted at this point that the present Nash equilibrium, which is to be found by solving a set of simultaneous equations, cannot be interpreted as the stable point of usual tat6nnement processes. For example, in a duopoly model a usual tat6nnement process considers that each firm reacts myopically to the quantity produced by its competitor by maximizing its own profit given this quantity. Under some hypotheses, this process converges to the Nash equilibrium. In the present case, the observation of the quantity produced by informed firms would clearly reveal some information about the true value of D to the uninformed firms and this transmission of information should be taken into account. If the situation to be modelled contains a true dynamic feature, it should be explicitly introduced into the model otherwise the role of information cannot be studied in a coherent game theoretic sense.
This note should be kept in mind for any interpretations of the results of this paper in a dynamic context. PROOF. This result will be proved as follows: first it will be shown to hold if k = N, i.e. all firms are informed; second, this will be extended for all values of k (1 < k < N). 3 The assumption of no corner solution is crucial for this theorem and if d is allowed to vary widely, it may easily be violated. It may also be interesting to note that the mathematical structure allowing this very simple result, which is the key to evaluating the expected values of information, is as follows: take an N person noncooperative game and let ui be the utility function of player i, if ui has the form 
Let k = N, then the expected value of perfect information on the random parameter D is the difference between the expected profits knowing d, EH7 (D I D = d), and the expected profits not knowing d, EH7(D). Using result (9), and the fact that if Y is a random variable and a and
PROOF. It may be useful to follow the reasoning using Figures 1, 2 and 3 . Figure 1 gives the graphical definition of the consumer surplus, it is the area of the shaded triangle. Note that it may be calculated as (d -p*)q*/2, and since p* = d -aq*, it is simply aq*2/2. In the no information game, the aggregate production is independent of the true value d; then, though the price and the demand function are modified depending on d, the consumer surplus remains exactly the same as if D were replaced by its expected value (Figure 2) .
In the I1 informed game, the aggregate production depends on the true value d through the production levels of the informed firms. Recall equation (12), In other words, there is a complete similarity between entry of new firms in a market with a known demand function and the acquisition of information by firms in a market with uncertain demand function. This gives an idea of the competitive advantage associated with the precise knowledge of the demand function. It is clear that uninformed firms have an incentive to acquire information whereas informed firms have an incentive not to share the information. In the information market, a barrier to entry is the cost of acquiring information, which may typically be a fixed cost. Then, one may expect that if this fixed cost is not too high (relative to the competitive advantage associated with information), all firms could acquire information (they may even make a syndicate to share the cost of experimentation and this collusion, provided it stops there, would be socially valuable). However, if the fixed cost is high, only a limited number of firms would acquire information until its cost equals its marginal competitive advantage for the newcomer. In this type of game, there is an advantage in moving first and the situation recalls a battle of sexes game (Luce and Raiffa [9] ). An interesting question would then be to explore a dynamic market model and see if the informed firms can keep their competitive advantage over time or if there is an inevitable diffusion of information through their past moves so that their competitive advantage would decrease as time goes on (for such a dynamic analysis in a zero sum context, see Ponssard [12] ).
Turning now to the consumer's point of view, Theorem 3 indicates that the consumer surplus increases when the firms are acquiring information. Moreover, it increases as the number of informed firms increases. Given the interpretation in terms of entry in the information market, this result is not surprising. It is to the consumer's interest that the firms are informed and that their number be as high as possible. But, this does not necessarily mean that if the consumer is given a strategic variable such as the possibility of revealing or not revealing the demand function, he may use a sincere strategy that always reveals his true preferences. This may be an interesting question for further study.
Taking a global point of view, one may conclude by saying that the social value of information is positive since it is positive for every economic agent. However, the preceding discussion gives certainly a more precise idea of this statement showing the partially antagonistic point of views among firms for the information market as well as between firms and consumer for the number of informed firms.5 5 Detailed comments by E. Kohlberg on an earlier version of this paper were very helpful.
